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In the present paper, we tested the ability of individuals to judge correctly whether
athletes are lying or telling the truth. For this purpose, we first generated 28 videos
as stimulus material: in half of the videos, soccer players were telling the truth, while
in the other half, the same soccer players were lying. Next, we tested the validity of
these video clips by asking N = 65 individuals in a laboratory experiment (Study 1a)
and N = 52 individuals in an online experiment (Study 1b) to rate the level of veracity
of each video clip. Results suggest that participants can distinguish between true and
false statements, but only for some clips and not for others, indicating that some players
were better at deceiving than others. In Study 2, participants again had to make veracity
estimations, but we manipulated the level of information given, as participants (N = 145)
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (regular video clips, mute video clips,
and only the audio stream of each statement). The results revealed that participants
from the mute condition were less accurate in their veracity ratings. The theoretical and
practical implications of these findings are discussed.
Keywords: deception, lying, truth, referee, soccer
INTRODUCTION
Antisocial behavior in sports and exercise contexts has been documented in several studies and
can be understood as intentional behavior designed to disadvantage other individuals (Kavussanu
et al., 2006). Research has focused on, among other topics, the prevalence of antisocial behavior
(e.g., Kavussanu, 2006), the use of illegal performance-enhancing drugs (e.g., Momaya et al., 2015),
or the reasons why athletes make the decision to display antisocial behavior in the first place
(e.g., Kavussanu and Roberts, 2001; Ommundsen et al., 2003). In the present paper, we focus on
deception in sports, which involves “making someone believe something that is not true in order
to get what you want” (Hsu, 1997), p. 167; for a review, see Güldenpenning et al. (2017). To gain an
advantage, athletes are oftentimes motivated to deceive the referee, as deception might change the
course of a match, for instance, when a soccer player is asking for a penalty during the last minutes
of a match even though there had been no foul (e.g., Traclet et al., 2011; Sabag et al., 2018).
Being able to detect deception is not only relevant during a sporting competition but also in
the criminal justice system (e.g., Akehurst et al., 1996) or in educational contexts (e.g., Marksteiner
et al., 2013). In fact, most studies on lie detection have been conducted in the context of the criminal
justice system, which is not surprising, as it is extremely important to classify a statement correctly
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in court as being true or false. In general, individuals are not
highly accurate when it comes to detecting truths and lies, as a
meta-analysis revealed they are only slightly better than chance
level (accuracy rate of 54%; e.g., Bond and DePaulo, 2006).
Overall, individuals are better at identifying a true statement
correctly (accuracy rate of 61%) than at identifying a lie correctly
(accuracy rate of 47%). Similar accuracy rates have been reported
in the field of sport psychology, for instance, in a study by Renden
et al. (2014) in which participants were asked to judge whether
tackle situations in soccer matches on television were either fouls
or dives. While there are plenty of correlational and qualitative
publications on judgment and decision making of sports officials
(for an overview see Aragão e Pina et al., 2018), there has been
little experimental research on referees’ ability to differentiate
correctly between a true statement and an invented one (e.g.,
Morris and Lewis, 2010). Experimental designs would allow one
to draw causal conclusions concerning which factors have a direct
influence on referees’ judgment and decision making (e.g., Morris
and Lewis, 2010; Sabag et al., 2018).
Therefore, which factors determine whether individuals are
capable of estimating accurately the truth of a statement? A meta-
analysis by Aamodt and Custer (2006) did not find empirical
evidence of a significant effect of gender, age, self-confidence,
or certain personality traits (e.g., extraversion) on accuracy
rates. Furthermore, expertise does not automatically lead to
judgements that are more accurate, meaning that laypersons
oftentimes do not differ significantly from experts in their
accuracy rates (Aamodt and Custer, 2006; Bond and DePaulo,
2006; del Campo et al., 2018). In sports, results partially suggest
that the level of expertise might have an influence on the accuracy
rates of judgments (e.g., Renden et al., 2014). However, given
the small number of studies on lie detection in sports, future
research is needed. Theoretically, the ability to identify correctly
both true and false statements hinges on two factors: first, on
the presence of cues that differentiate between true and false
statements (i.e., valid cues), and second, on individuals’ ability to
perceive these cues and to use them in a correct manner (so-called
cue usage). This means that individuals must use only valid cues
and neglect non-valid cues. Furthermore, they must know how
specific cues relate to the probability of a statement being true
or false. There are several potential factors which can influence
the ability to differentiate between true and false statements [e.g.,
Need for Cognition (NFC); e.g., Reinhard, 2010]. However, in the
present studies, we were primarily interested in (a) developing
a valid experimental lie detection research paradigm in sports
and (b) investigating individuals’ ability to properly judge critical
game situations.
In line with these considerations, Vrij et al. (2006) propose
that one potential explanation for the low detection rates seems
to be that individuals oftentimes hold inadequate beliefs about
valid cues related to deception. For instance, in laypersons and
experts, there is a common stereotypic belief that liars have a
tendency to avoid eye contact and to display strong nervous
body movements (e.g., Bond and DePaulo, 2006). However,
DePaulo et al. (2003) did not find any empirical support for
these non-verbal and para-verbal cues. Research has repeatedly
demonstrated that relying on these invalid cues when making
a judgment affects the accuracy rates negatively (e.g., Frank
and Ekman, 2004). In general, non-verbal cues, such as the
aforementioned ones, are less strongly related to deception than
verbal cues (i.e., the content of the respective statement). Several
studies identified the following valid verbal cues to deception:
lies are not as logically structured as true statements, lies are less
plausible, lies do not contain as many relevant details, and lies are
more ambivalent than true statements (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003).
Therefore, it seems beneficial to focus on verbal cues instead
of non-verbal or para-verbal cues to make an accurate veracity
judgment (Forrest et al., 2004).
As previously mentioned, there has been little experimental
research in sports-related contexts on antisocial behavior in
general and on lie detection in particular. Instead, most studies on
antisocial behavior collected data either by interviewing coaches
regarding specific behaviors (e.g., Stuart and Ebbeck, 1995) or
by asking individuals how they would behave in hypothetical
situations (e.g., Kavussanu and Ntoumanis, 2003). One of the
only studies that used an experimental design to investigate lie
detection in sports was conducted by Morris and Lewis (2010).
In their study, they first created five video clips as stimulus
material in which they instructed amateur soccer players to
exaggerate the effects of a tackle by an opponent in a convincing
manner. They videotaped these sequences and asked participants
in another study to watch these video clips and to make a
judgment regarding the level of exaggeration of the tackled player
depicted in the video clip. The results of this study revealed
that participants were fairly accurate in estimating the level
of exaggeration.
In the present paper, we were not interested in the prevalence
of deception or in the reasons why athletes decide to deceive
the referee; instead, we focused on the ability of individuals
to detect lies. We first created the stimulus material, which
consisted of 28 videos in which soccer players were either
telling the truth or lying (see also Morris and Lewis, 2010). In
Study 1a (laboratory) and Study 1b (online), we tested these
video clips by asking participants to rate the veracity of each
video (for a similar approach, see Morris and Lewis, 2010).
The participants did not see the actual game situation, but only
the interview with the respective player which took place after
the critical incident. There were two reasons for replicating
Study 1a: First, we wanted to make sure that both participants’
ability to discriminate between true and false statements and
potential differences between video pairs found in Study 1a
reflect systematic differences instead of simply random variation.
Second, we wanted to make sure that results do not depend on a
laboratory setting, but can also be obtained in an online setting
(for a discussion on the replication crisis, see also Klein Richard
et al., 2014). In Study 2, we manipulated the type of information
presented to the participants, where participants watched the
original video clips (i.e., original condition), watched the original
video clips without containing any auditory information (i.e.,
mute condition), or only listened to the audio stream without
seeing the actual video clip (i.e., audio condition). In line with
previous research, which has shown that non-verbal cues are less
reliable than verbal cues (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003), we assumed
that participants from the mute condition would be less accurate
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in their veracity assessments than participants from the other
two conditions. We will explain the stimulus material and the
studies in more detail in the following sections. The local ethics
committee approved all studies reported in this paper.
GENERATION OF THE STIMULUS
MATERIAL
Fourteen male soccer players (Mage = 23.36, SDage = 4.77) from a
club from the sixth highest league in Germany (out of 11 leagues)
volunteered to participate to create the stimulus material (for this
procedure, see Marksteiner et al., 2015; see also Levine et al.,
2011). On average, the players had played soccer for 18 years
(SD = 3.72), and there were defensive, offensive, and midfield
players among them. The study was conducted in single sessions
on a regular soccer pitch. We obtained written informed consent
from each participant before commencing the study.
Each participant played the part of a defender twice, leading
to two scenarios. In both scenarios, two confederates acted as
attacking players from the opposing team (for the setup, see
Figure 1). One confederate played a long pass toward the goal
line for his teammate (i.e., the second confederate). In one
scenario, the defender’s job was to prevent the opposing player
from reaching the ball and to let the ball cross the goal line so
that the defender’s team would get the goal kick. In the second
scenario, however, the defender was instructed to touch the ball
slightly before it crossed the goal line, so that the correct decision
would actually be a corner kick instead of a goal kick. In both
scenarios, after the ball had crossed the line, the referee blew
his whistle, requested the defender to come over to a marked
position immediately where a video camera was set up, and asked
him a series of seven questions (1. Who was the last player to
touch the ball? 2. Are you sure? 3. Why is the other player
saying something different? 4. Are you sure? 5. Again, who was
the last player to touch the ball? 6. Are you sure about that?
7. Why should I believe you?). These questions were developed
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the experimental setup for the generation of the
stimulus material. The player wearing the jacket is a confederate acting as an
attacking player, the player wearing the white jersey is a confederate acting as
the teammate of the attacking player, and the player wearing the black jersey
is the target player acting as the defender. The referee is standing on the right,
observing the scene.
in cooperation with an official German B-level referee and an
A-level soccer coach (both handed out by the German Football
Association) to ensure the questions would be as realistic as
possible. The defender was instructed to state in both scenarios
that the attacker was the last player to touch the ball and that
the referee should decide on a goal kick. That way, we generated
two videos from each participant: one video in which he was
telling the truth and one video in which he was lying (order
counterbalanced). The referee was blind to the condition and did
not see the actual critical game scene, as he turned away when
the tackling happened. To increase participants’ motivation, we
offered tickets to a Bundesliga soccer match (first German soccer
division) to the one player who was the most convincing. That
way, we generated 28 videos in total (14 true statements, 14 lie
statements). Each video lasted approximately 28 s (M = 27.5,
SD = 6.27) and contained the same amount of questions asked
by the same non-visible referee. Each player’s upper torso, face,
and legs could be seen on all video tapes and the sound quality
was the same in all video clips.
STUDY 1A
The aim of Study 1a was twofold: first, we wanted to investigate
the question of whether participants are able to distinguish
between true and false statements. Based on existing research,
we expected participants to be able to distinguish between true
and false statements; however, we expected a small to medium
effect size at best (e.g., Bond and DePaulo, 2006). Second, we
aimed to determine whether participants’ ability to distinguish
between true and false statements differed between video pairs. In
other words, we wanted to find out whether some of the players
we filmed were better liars than others were. We were interested
in determining which video pairs were more ambiguous (i.e.,
the veracity ratings of the true and untrue statements of the
respective target players do not differ significantly) and which
video pairs were less ambiguous (i.e., the veracity ratings of




A total of N = 65 university students from a German
university participated voluntarily in this study (26 female;
MAge = 24.66 years, SDAge = 4.24). Eight participants had
refereeing experience (M = 3.88 years, SD = 3.87). All
participants delivered written informed consent before taking
part in the research.
Design, Procedure, and Measures
The study was conducted in the university’s laboratory and the
videos and all the instructions were administered on a regular
computer screen using an online survey software (Unipark).
After delivering demographic information (age, sex, mother
tongue, and refereeing experience), the 28 videos were displayed
in a random order. The participants were informed that in each
video clip a player would be asked a series of questions by a
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True statement False statement
M SD M SD F η2p
1 6.08 2.53 5.89 2.61 0.19 0.00
2 5.83 2.52 4.09 2.47 26.27** 0.29
3 6.37 2.36 5.12 2.49 9.34** 0.13
4 4.26 2.32 3.89 2.10 0.87 0.01
5 8.35 1.87 6.46 2.50 22.03** 0.26
6 5.22 2.80 3.55 2.29 17.82** 0.22
7 7.09 2.19 5.62 2.73 14.97** 0.19
8 6.14 2.74 6.60 2.67 1.35 0.02
9 7.06 2.46 6.17 2.88 4.51* 0.07
10 6.26 2.60 5.65 2.70 2.18 0.03
11 3.15 2.39 4.25 2.65 10.66** 0.14
12 6.37 2.44 5.78 2.81 1.83 0.03
13 5.12 2.45 5.71 2.66 2.04 0.03
14 3.97 2.51 4.03 2.22 0.03 0.00
Note. N = 65. Each video was rated on a continuous scale ranging from 1 (not at
all true) to 10 (totally true). ∗p < 0.05. ∗∗p < 0.01.
professional referee and that they had to rate the veracity of
each video clip. All participants were wearing regular stereo
headphones and the sound was played at a constant volume.
Following each video clip, participants rated the truth of each
statement on a continuous scale ranging from 1 (not at all true)
to 10 (totally true; for this procedure, see Marksteiner et al.,
2013). Finally, the participants were debriefed and thanked for
their participation.
Results
Overall, participants were able to distinguish between false
and true statements. The veracity ratings of false statements
(M = 5.20, SD = 0.78) were lower on average than the veracity
ratings of true statements (M = 5.81, SD = 0.82). A within-subject
analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicates that this difference is
a significant one, F(1,64) = 28.29, p < 0.0001, η2p = 0.31.
Furthermore, results suggest that participants were indeed able
to distinguish between true and false statements for some but not
all video pairs.
To test for which video pairs participants were able to
distinguish between true and false statements, we conducted
within-subject ANOVAs for each video pair. These analyses
resulted in seven ambiguous video pairs (i.e., there were no
significant differences between the veracity ratings for the
true and the deceptive statements) and seven less-ambiguous
video pairs (i.e., the veracity ratings for the true and the
deceptive statements differed significantly). The detailed results
are illustrated in Table 1.
Discussion
The results of Study 1a suggest that, overall, participants
are able to distinguish between true and false statements
in our stimulus material; however, this ability differs for
different video pairs. Furthermore, they revealed that out
of the 14 video pairs, seven video pairs were ambiguous,
meaning the veracity ratings of the true and deceptive
statements of these target players did not differ significantly.
On the contrary, for the other seven video pairs, participants
were able to differentiate correctly between the true and
deceptive statements.
STUDY 1B
The primary aim of Study 1b was to test whether the
pattern found in Study 1a is robust in a novel study to
ensure that both participants’ ability to discriminate between
true and false statements and the differences between video
pairs found in Study 1a reflects a systematic difference
between true and false statements and between video pairs.
Furthermore, we wanted to test whether the results depend
on a laboratory setting or whether they will also emerge in
an online setting (for a discussion on the replication crisis,
see also Klein Richard et al., 2014). For this cause, we
posted an online link on various social platforms that led




In total, N = 94 individuals clicked the online link and n = 52
individuals finished the study. The individuals who accessed
the online survey were informed of the purpose of the study,
delivered informed consent, and confirmed that they agreed to
participate voluntarily. All the following analyses were conducted
only with the participants who finished the study (29 female;
MAge = 36.54 years, SDAge = 15.76). Three participants had
refereeing experience (M = 3.33 years, SD = 4.04).
Design, Procedure, and Measures
The design was identical to the design of Study 1a, with the only
difference being that Study 1b was conducted online. Participants
delivered demographic information and rated the veracity of all
28 videos (Marksteiner et al., 2013). Finally, we thanked the
participants for their participation and debriefed them.
Results
Main Analyses
Just as in Study 1a, overall, participants were able to distinguish
between false and true statements. The veracity ratings of the
false statements (M = 5.38, SD = 1.21) were lower on average
than the veracity ratings of the true statements (M = 5.82,
SD = 1.07). A within-subject ANOVA indicates that this
difference is significant, F(1,51) = 14.69, p < 0.0001, η2p = 0.22.
We again ran within-subject ANOVAs for each video pair to
determine which video pairs were ambiguous and which were
non-ambiguous (for detailed results, see Table 2). In Study 1b, for
seven video pairs, there were no significant differences between
the veracity ratings for the true and the deceptive statements
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True statement False statement
M SD M SD F η2p
1 5.33 2.80 5.35 2.62 0.01 0.00
2 5.25 2.61 4.96 2.71 0.36 0.01
3 7.02 2.44 5.94 2.49 5.40* 0.10
4 4.58 2.67 5.25 2.88 3.15 0.06
5 7.52 2.41 6.21 2.47 9.88** 0.16
6 6.04 2.61 4.87 2.69 8.74** 0.15
7 6.83 2.47 5.54 2.85 7.64** 0.13
8 5.56 2.73 5.04 2.60 1.55 0.03
9 7.33 2.10 6.60 2.80 3.59* 0.07
10 5.60 3.12 5.67 2.71 0.03 0.00
11 4.06 2.86 5.17 2.69 15.76** 0.24
12 6.17 2.61 5.65 2.66 1.39 0.03
13 5.15 2.52 5.02 2.52 0.11 0.00
14 5.08 2.50 4.08 2.47 9.27** 0.15
Note. N = 52. Each video was rated on a continuous scale ranging from 1 (not at
all true) to 10 (totally true). ∗p < 0.05. ∗∗p < 0.01.
(i.e., ambiguous video pairs), while seven other video pairs
were non-ambiguous.
Additional Analyses
As exploratory analyses, given that the basic designs of Studies
1a (laboratory setting) and 1b (online setting) were identical,
we merged the data from both studies into a single data sheet
and ran additional analyses. A within-subject ANOVA confirmed
that overall participants were able to distinguish between false
statements (M = 5.28, SD = 0.99) and true statements (M = 5.81,
SD = 0.94), F(1,116) = 42.83, p < 0.0001, η2p = 0.27.
Additional within-subject ANOVAs for each video pair were
also conducted to determine which video pairs were ambiguous
and which were non-ambiguous (for detailed results, see Table 3).
Taken together, the analyses confirmed that for seven video pairs
there were no significant differences between the veracity ratings
for the true and the deceptive statements (i.e., ambiguous video
pairs), while for the seven other video pairs there were significant
differences (i.e., non-ambiguous video pairs).
Discussion
When comparing the results of Study 1a and Study 1b, six
video pairs were classified as ambiguous in both studies and six
video pairs were classified as non-ambiguous in both studies. In
addition, one video pair was classified as ambiguous in Study 1a
but not as such in Study 1b, and one video pair was classified
as ambiguous in Study 1b but not as such in Study 1a. When
merging the data from both studies into a single data file,
the results remained stable. The fact that the results of both
studies were so similar, even though Study 1a was conducted
in a laboratory while Study 1b was conducted online, suggests
that our stimulus material is also suited to be applied in future
online research.
STUDY 2
The aim of Study 2 was to investigate whether the type of
information given to the participants influences the accuracy
of the veracity ratings. Previous research suggests that verbal
behavior (i.e., the content of the statement) is more reliable than
non-verbal and para-verbal behavior (e.g., Bond and DePaulo,
2006). This is why we tested the assumption that participants
watching mute versions of the 28 video clips would be less
accurate in their veracity ratings than participants watching the
regular video clips and participants only listening to the verbal
statements without actually seeing the video clips.
Methods
Participants
The sample consisted of N = 145 students from a Swiss and a
German university who volunteered to take part in this study
(87 female; MAge = 27.03 years, SDAge = 7.4); 22 participants had
refereeing experience (M = 1.85 years, SD = 0.36). Before starting
the experimental procedure, each participant delivered written
informed consent.
Design, Procedure, and Measures
The experiment took place in the universities’ laboratories, and
the videos, as well as all the instructions, were displayed on a
regular computer screen. The general experimental setup was
identical to the two previous studies, with the only difference
being that we manipulated the type of information given to the
participants. Participants were randomly assigned to a condition
that included the original video clips (i.e., original condition;
n = 49), one that included the original video clips without
any auditory information (i.e., mute condition; n = 47), or
one that only included the audio stream of each video clip
without any visual information (i.e., audio condition; n = 49).
The resulting design was a 2 (true vs. false statements) × 3
(original condition vs. mute condition vs. audio condition) mixed
design with repeated measurement on the first factor and a
between-participants manipulation on the second. In all three
conditions, participants were wearing regular stereo headphones
and, as in the previous studies, participants rated the truth of
each statement on a continuous scale from 1 (not at all true) to
10 (totally true; Marksteiner et al., 2013). Finally, we thanked the
participants for their participation and debriefed them.
Results
Main Analyses
We conducted a 2 (type of statement: true vs. false) × 3
(experimental group: original condition vs. mute condition vs.
audio condition) mixed-design ANOVA to test our hypotheses.
There was a significant main effect of the type of statement,
F(1,142) = 10.45, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.07. We also found a
significant main effect of the experimental group, F(2,142) = 9.35,
p < 0.0001, η2p = 0.12. As expected, there was also a significant
interaction between the type of statement (true or false) and
the type of experimental group (original condition vs. mute
condition vs. audio condition), F(2,142) = 6.91, p = 0.001,
η2p = 0.09. Mean estimations of statements’ veracity suggest
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TABLE 3 | Study 1a and b combined: Veracity ratings for the true and the false
statements of each video pair.
Video pair
number
True statement False statement
M SD M SD F η2p
1 5.74 2.67 5.65 2.61 0.86 0.00
2 5.57 2.56 4.48 2.60 14.13** 0.11
3 6.66 2.41 5.49 2.51 14.74** 0.11
4 4.40 2.48 4.50 2.56 0.11 0.00
5 7.98 2.16 6.35 2.48 31.58** 0.21
6 5.58 2.74 4.14 2.55 26.49** 0.19
7 6.97 2.31 5.58 2.77 22.25** 0.16
8 5.88 2.74 5.91 2.74 0.10 0.00
9 7.18 2.30 6.36 2.84 8.09* 0.07
10 5.97 2.85 5.66 2.70 0.97 0.01
11 3.56 2.63 4.66 2.70 24.45** 0.17
12 6.28 2.51 5.73 2.73 3.25 0.03
13 5.14 2.47 5.40 2.61 0.83 0.01
14 4.46 2.56 4.05 2.33 2.68 0.02
Note. N = 117. Each video was rated on a continuous scale ranging from 1 (not at
all true) to 10 (totally true). ∗p < 0.05. ∗∗p < 0.01.
TABLE 4 | Study 3: Mean veracity ratings for the true and false statements,
separated by condition (original, mute, audio).
Condition True statements False statements
M SD M SD
Original 5.60 0.79 5.20 0.86
Mute 4.97 0.85 5.10 0.76
Audio 5.89 0.86 5.52 0.99
N = 145. Each video was rated on a continuous scale ranging from 1 (not at all
true) to 10 (totally true).
that only participants in the original condition and in the
audio condition were able to distinguish between true and false
statements, but not participants in the mute condition (Table 3).
Follow-up t-tests suggest that, indeed, participants in the original
condition (t[48] = 3.14, p = 0.003) and in the audio condition
(t[48] = 3.24, p = 0.002) were able to distinguish between true
and false statements, whereas participants in the mute condition
were not (t[46] = -1.42, p = 0.16). Importantly, both main effects
are qualified by this interaction.
It is an interesting question whether the above-described
interaction between the type of statement and the type of
experimental group is driven by both the true and false
statements or solely by one group of statements. Furthermore, it
is an open question whether the finding is driven more strongly
by the more ambiguous or the less ambiguous statements.
Therefore, we conducted some additional analyses to address
these questions. Contrary to the main analysis, these additional
analyses were exploratory in nature.
Additional Analyses
When looking at the true and false statements separately, data
suggest that participants in the original condition and in the
audio condition were better at identifying true statements as true
than participants in the mute condition. Mean estimates for the
true statements (on a scale where high values indicate truth) are
higher by almost one standard deviation in the original condition
and in the audio condition than in the mute condition (Table 4).
As can be expected, a one-way between-group ANOVA delivered
a significant main effect of the type of information given on
the ratings of the true statements, F(2,142) = 10.55, p < 0.0001,
η2p = 0.17, which can be considered a large effect (Cohen,
1988). There is no such difference for the false statements,
F(2,142) = 3.03, p = 0.051, η2p = 0.04.
Studies 1a and 1b indicated that individuals were unable to
differentiate between the true and the deceptive statements in
six video pairs, meaning the deceptive statements of six target
players were rather difficult to differentiate from their true
statements. Therefore, we were also interested in whether the
type of information given affected the veracity ratings of these
six target players (the high-ambiguous pairs) differently from
the veracity ratings of the other eight target players (the low-
ambiguous pairs). To investigate this question, we conducted a
2 (type of statement: true vs. false) × 2 (ambiguity of statement:
high vs. low) × 3 (experimental group: original condition vs.
mute condition vs. audio condition) mixed-design ANOVA with
repeated measures on the first and second factors. The crucial
triple interaction does not become significant, suggesting that
the pattern described above does not differ significantly for the
high-ambiguous and low-ambiguous video pairs, F(2,142) = 1.28,
p = 0.282, η2p = 0.018.
Discussion
Participants in the original condition and in the audio condition
were able to distinguish between true and false statements,
whereas participants in the mute condition were not. As
hypothesized, this pattern suggests that verbal information (i.e.,
content of statements) is necessary for distinguishing true and
false statements, whereas non-verbal behavior alone is not
sufficient. Further analyses suggest that the above-described
effect was driven primarily by the true statements: participants
in the original condition and in the audio condition rated
the true statements as being truer, but they did not rate the
false statements as being more false. This pattern suggests
tentatively that the verbal content of the true statements included
cues signaling their truth-value. Alternatively, one might also
reason that visual content is not as important in the true
statements as in the false statements. We cannot rule out
the possibility that a third variable that is confounded with
our experimental manipulation might at least partly drive the
differences between the experimental conditions. For example, it
might be that the experimental manipulations induce different
levels of cognitive load (e.g., Paas et al., 2003) or mental fatigue
(e.g., Englert, 2019). To the extent that cognitive load as well
as mental fatigue influence the ability to distinguish between
true and false statements, this would explain the differences
between the experimental conditions. Therefore, we suggest
that future research utilizes control variables (e.g., a scale
assessing cognitive load or mental fatigue) in order to rule out
alternative explanations.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Taken together, results from the three studies suggest that
participants are able to distinguish between true and false
statements when confronted with our stimulus material. When
looking at all 14 video pairs at the same time, the mean difference
between the veracity ratings of true and false statements is small,
indicating that participants are not very good at discriminating
true and false statements, as prior research suggests (e.g., Bond
and DePaulo, 2006). Interestingly, however, when looking at
all 14 video pairs separately, it becomes apparent that the
generally small difference when considering all pairs at the
same time is caused by averaging differences of varying sizes:
for some video pairs, there are large differences between true
and false statements, indicating that participants were able
to distinguish well between truth and lies. For other pairs,
these differences are smaller, and for some, there are no
differences at all, indicating that, on average, participants were
unable to distinguish between truths and lies for these pairs.
Importantly, this pattern is almost identical in Studies 1A
and 1B, suggesting that the differences described above do
not merely capture random variation, but constitute systematic
differences between videos.
There are two possible (and admittedly speculative)
explanations for this pattern of results: first, it might simply
be that some video pairs contained valid cues, whereas others
did not. Second, it might be that all video pairs contained
valid cues, but participants did not use them in some of the
videos. For example, participants might not have used some
cues because they were not in line with their preconceptions
about what constitutes valid cues for lie detection, as suggested
by some previous research (e.g., Vrij et al., 2006). The results
of Study 2 suggest that the verbal cues were valid, unlike the
non-verbal cues. This becomes evident through the observation
that the participants in the mute condition were less adept
at discriminating between true and false statements. Again,
this finding is in line with previous research (e.g., Bond and
DePaulo, 2006). We believe that the above described differences
between video pairs might be important from theoretical,
methodological, and applied perspectives, and thus inspire
future research. From a theoretical perspective, future research
might shed light onto the reasons underlying differences in
discrimination. From a methodological perspective, differences
between video pairs emphasize that researchers need to be
cautious when averaging single items (e.g., Rose, 2016). From an
applied perspective, finally, researchers might want to investigate
whether discrimination performance can be improved in general,
and for the hard-to-discriminate statements in particular. When
there are differences regarding the ratings of the two different
videos of one player, it seems obvious to interpret this difference
as being caused by the videos’ veracity. However, we consider it
important to keep in mind that other differences between the
videos might have caused the different ratings.
The current results are in line with the interpretation that
participants think that the players were in general truthful
and thus rated them as such. It is an open question how
our results would look like if participants had assumed that
players are generally untruthful. Therefore, we suggest that future
research investigates into participants’ presuppositions regarding
players’ truthfulness.
The present research has some strengths, but also some
limitations. The main strength of the present paper is that we
employed an experimental manipulation of lying and telling the
truth, which was rather naturalistic at the same time. Obviously,
a referee in a real match would never turn away from the action
on purpose; however, this was simply our operationalization of
a referee not having seen the relevant action. In real matches,
it does happen that referees do not see the relevant action,
for example, because they were in a position where their line
of sight was obstructed. In these situations, referees may well
communicate with players. If a scenario like the one from our
studies happened in the real world, referees would probably talk
to both players involved. In this case, their task would be slightly
different from the one employed in our studies: Referees would
not necessarily have to judge who is lying and who is saying the
truth, but they would have to judge which player they consider
to be more trustworthy—even if both of them might appear to be
lying (or vice versa). We somewhat simplified this situation for
our studies, but the essential task is the same: Judge the veracity
of a given statement based on the cues available. Additionally,
we consider it to be a strength of the present research that the
present findings do not rely on a single study alone but on a set
of three studies.
The main limitation of the present research is that, obviously,
we cannot make inferences beyond the stimulus material used
in our studies. Therefore, we cannot be sure that the findings
described above can be generalized to other settings (e.g., other
players being filmed, other reasons to lie, or other questions
asked). However, we tried to incorporate at least some variation
into our stimulus material by filming 14 soccer players and
by asking them a set of standardized questions. Additionally,
the differences observed between video pairs suggest that we
managed to capture at least some variation in answering behavior.
Still, future research should replicate the present findings using
novel stimulus material. We would also like to mention that
our video clips only included male soccer players. Even though
previous research from the criminal justice system has revealed
that gender does not have a significant effect on veracity
judgments (e.g., Bond and DePaulo, 2006), we would recommend
a replication of our findings with female soccer players to increase
the generalizability.
Future studies might look at a direct comparison between a
player who is lying and one who is telling the truth, as suggested
above. For this research objective, the scenario from our studies
would have to be adapted, so that both players involved can both
lie and tell the truth. From a theoretical perspective, this approach
might be fruitful not only for research on lie detection in sports,
but for research on lie detection generally: In contrast to many
other applications of lie detection research, in the situation that
we investigated, when one player lies, the other one must be
telling the truth. Therefore, this situation allows for investigating
into the role of the relative veracity of statements as compared to
the role of the absolute one, a comparison that is not possible in
many classic lie detection scenarios.
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Another important question is which potential factors
determine whether individuals have a tendency to rely on valid
verbal cues or on stereotypical non-verbal cues. According to
Reinhard (2010), NFC is an important factor in this regard. NFC
is a personality trait which can be defined as cognitive motivation,
meaning the tendency to engage in and enjoy cognitive effort
(Cacioppo and Petty, 1982). Previous research has shown that
individuals high in NFC primarily base their judgments on
valid verbal cues whereas lower levels of NFC are related to a
predominant use of non-verbal cues (Reinhard, 2010). Future
studies should focus on potential moderators of lie detection
performance. One further limitation of the current research is
that its relation to real-life situations is not very strong. Thus, we
caution against prematurely deriving practical recommendations
from this research. Furthermore, we suggest that future research
tries to connect to real in-game situations more strongly.
We would also like to acknowledge that our interpretations
mostly hinge on comparing the two videos of one pair to
each other. That means, we conclude that participants could
successfully distinguish lie from truth when the two examples of
one video pair differed significantly from each other. However,
we did for the most part not take into account the absolute
ratings of the respective videos. For example, the ratings of
two videos might significantly differ from each other, but both
videos are rated in the upper half of the scale, signaling that
participants rated both of them being rather true than false,
albeit with one of them being rated “truer” than the other.
For the goals of our studies, this approach seems to make
sense, as we were primarily interested in participants’ ability to
distinguish truth from lies, and additionally we were interested
into first evidence regarding the cues participants base their
ratings on. However, research with different goals will probably
have to use different comparisons. For example, researchers
interested into the question whether different persons are rated
differently regarding their trustworthiness will probably want to
look at comparisons between persons, and not between video
pairs. Likewise, researchers interested into the question whether
certain factors may influence participants’ general willingness
to believe that a statement is true or false (i.e., their prior
beliefs) will probably want to investigate whether videos’ ratings
depend on the variation of the assumed influencing variables.
In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of lie detection,
researchers would probably have to model veracity ratings as a
joint function of (a) participants’ prior beliefs about the likelihood
of a statement being true or false (while these beliefs might
themselves vary based, for example, on context); (b) person
characteristics of the potential liars that have been shown to
influence veracity ratings (and which might themselves interact
with participants’ characteristics and prior beliefs; (c) cues
inherent in the statements themselves (e.g., verbal and non-verbal
cues); and (d) contextual factors influencing the ability to detect
lies (e.g., contextual load). Such an approach would surely be
able to overcome much of the shortcomings of current research
on lie-detection and thus it might be able to provide a more
comprehensive picture of lie-detection.
Given the still preliminary and not highly applied nature
of our research, we are careful to derive any practical
recommendations for referees. Our research appears to suggest
that referees should not try to deduce lies or truths from
non-verbal behavior, but rather should rely on verbal cues.
This suggestion is supported by previous research in domains
other than refereeing (Vrij et al., 2010), and it is supported by
our present data. Given the overall poor ability of humans to
discriminate between true and false statements (e.g., Bond and
DePaulo, 2006), at least without formal analysis, as employed
in legal proceedings, we suggest that basing a decision on a
judgment about the veracity of a statement without further
information should probably be employed as a last resort only.
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